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Abstract: 
In this paper I explore the possibility and rationality of interpersonal mechanisms of doxastic self-
control, that is, ways in which individuals can make use of other people in order to get themselves to 
stick to their beliefs. I look, in particular, at two ways in which people can make interpersonal epistemic 
commitments, and thereby willingly undertake accountability to others, in order to get themselves to 
maintain their beliefs in the face of anticipated ‘epistemic temptations’. The first way is through the 
avowal of belief, and the second is through the establishment of collective belief. I argue that both of 
these forms of interpersonal epistemic commitment can function as effective tools for doxastic self-control, 
and, moreover, that the control they facilitate should not be dismissed as irrational from an epistemic 
perspective.  
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Introduction  
Amongst the epistemic virtues perhaps the most prized are openness and sensitivity to 
evidence. As believers, we should expose ourselves to relevant evidence, and form, revise 
or suspend our beliefs in response to what that evidence demands. We should not leap to 
judgment on the basis of scant evidence, or form beliefs that contradict the facts at our 
disposal, and we should not be stubborn when our evidence demands that we change our 
minds. The trouble, however, is that it is not always clear, from the first person perspective, 
just what our evidence is and what it demands: what seems to be evidence might turn out 
to be mere distortion, illusion and temptation. Our thinking is pervaded by cognitive biases, 
and unduly influenced by all manner of emotional, social and situational pressures—none 
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of which are easily identified and neutralized by the agent herself as she makes up her mind 
or as she maintains her attitudes. 
 
Considerations such as these suggest that, alongside openness and evidential sensitivity, 
there is also a place for something like doxastic self-control in our cognitive lives. Like practical 
self-control, doxastic self-control is needed to overcome certain forms of characteristic 
weakness. Such control might be exerted in the formation of belief, as when a person takes 
pains to gather all the relevant evidence before she makes up her mind—rather than 
judging on the basis of a small, perhaps convenient, portion of it. And it might be exerted 
in the maintenance of belief, as when a person takes steps to guard her rationally-held beliefs 
from ‘epistemic temptations’ (Paul 2015a) or ‘distorters’ (Pettit 2016b). It is this latter, 
diachronic form of doxastic self-control that will be my specific focus here.  
 
My aim in this paper is to build on recent work by Sarah Paul, who has argued that there 
is a place for doxastic self-control in our cognitive lives.1 But whereas Paul sees such self-
control as a fundamentally individual achievement, I wish to examine social tools of doxastic 
self-control—ways in which we might enlist the help of others in order to stick to our 
beliefs. More specifically, I explore whether people can stick to their beliefs by making 
interpersonal epistemic commitments, and whether doing this could count as an epistemically 
rational strategy for doxastic self-control.  
 
The reason for this focus on interpersonal epistemic commitment is that interpersonal 
commitment is a familiar tool for getting oneself to stick to one’s plans and intentions, that 
is, for practical self-control. For example, there is evidence to suggest that one way to get 
yourself to do something is to promise somebody that you will do it; another is to make a 
joint plan or agreement to do it with others.2 Promises and agreements are two forms of 
interpersonal commitment, two ways in which people make themselves responsible or 
accountable to others, and it is this that appears to make them apt tools for practical self-
control. In making a promise or an agreement one gives oneself added incentive to stick 
                                                 
1 See Paul (2015a,b) 
2 See footnote 11 below for references. 
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to one’s intention, because other people are now authorized to hold one accountable 
should one fail to follow through.  
 
Since promises and agreements appear to be effective tools for practical self-control, we 
may ask whether there are analogous tools available for doxastic self-control. Here I 
explore two such candidates, which can be seen as the counterparts of promising and 
agreements: belief-avowals, and the establishment of collective belief. Drawing on work 
from Philip Pettit on avowal, and Margaret Gilbert on collective belief, I will suggest that 
both these ways of fortifying one’s beliefs might, in principle, be effective tools of doxastic 
self-control. To end off, I consider the further question of whether they can also be 
considered rational mechanisms of doxastic control. I suggest that although neither of 
these mechanisms would be deemed rational by the lights of a strict evidentialist, they can 
nonetheless be considered rational from a slightly more relaxed perspective, since they do 
seem capable of promoting true, responsible believing.  
 
1. Doxastic fortitude 
1.1 Doxastic weakness 
To get a sense of what is meant by doxastic self-control, it may be helpful to consider its 
negative counterpart, what could be called doxastic flimsiness. Someone is flimsy in belief 
when she allows non-evidential factors to unseat her rationally-held beliefs. To illustrate 
this, consider the following two examples. 
 
SUSCEPTIBLE GAMBLER: Suzie is a bright, diligent student. In her critical 
reasoning class she learns of the ‘gambler’s fallacy’, the false belief that, for example, 
the prospect of a fair coin toss coming up heads becomes more likely after a series 
of tails. She becomes fully convinced that the gambler’s fallacy is indeed a fallacy, 
and is even able to demonstrate this by applying Bayes’ theorem. However, when 
Suzie decides to visit the local casino with some friends, she finds that this 
conviction (that the gambler’s fallacy is a fallacy) begins to shrink from view. She 
does recall having been persuaded of it in her critical reasoning class, but now 
amongst the bright lights and the loud music of the casino she cannot recall the 
grounds for that conviction. In fact, as she stands at the roulette table, the very 
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opposite conviction takes over: it just seems obvious to her that the long string of 
reds makes black a good, almost sure bet. Later that evening, reflecting on her lost 
savings, Suzie curses herself for falling victim to the fallacy. Once again the 
fallacious character of the gambler’s fallacy is clear to her. ‘What was I thinking?!’ 
she says to herself. (Adapted from McGeer & Pettit 2009). 
 
UNDERCONFIDENT PHILOSOPHER: Suzie is now an early-career 
philosopher. She has developed a well-worked out view (p) on a niche topic, and is 
ready to present the view at a large philosophy conference. Suzie not only has a 
powerful argument for her view that p, but has considered many possible objections 
to p and has solid replies to all of them. In short, she wholeheartedly believes that 
p, on the best possible philosophical grounds. Nevertheless, when it comes time to 
give her presentation, Suzie notices a number of famous, and notoriously 
disagreeable, older philosophers in the audience. Though none of these 
philosophers even work in her field, she anticipates that they will take issue with 
her view that p and vehemently oppose her—just for the sport of it, as it were. And 
she is right: the question-and-answer session after her presentation sees these 
luminaries bombarding Suzie with crude, ill-informed objections. But in the 
moment Suzie fails to see these objections for what they are: in her nervousness 
and exhaustion, she gives these famous philosophers too much credit, and as a 
result, begins to backtrack on many of her key claims, and ultimately retreat into 
uncertainty with regard to p. Later, going over her notes from the session, Suzie 
sees that these famous philosophers’ objections do not threaten her view at all, or 
that she has ready replies to them. So she returns to her wholehearted belief that p, 
but now feels profound disappointment and regret that she was not able to stick to 
her guns when under fire. (Adapted from Paul 2015a: 655).   
 
There are a few things worth highlighting in these examples. First, it is assumed that in 
both cases Suzie really does start out with the beliefs in question—that she really believes 
the gambler’s fallacy is a fallacy, and that she really believes her philosophical account, p. 
Perhaps some would want to deny this, thinking that Suzie’s subsequent behavior shows 
that she never had those beliefs in the first place. But I think this is an unreasonably 
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onerous requirement on belief: there is nothing in the concept of belief itself that requires 
this level of robustness or constancy. People routinely change their minds, or have their 
minds changed, without this impugning the status of their erstwhile attitudes. 
 
The second feature worth noting is that Suzie’s failure in both cases is her failure to 
maintain those original beliefs, rather than merely her failure to act in accordance with 
them. So it is not that Suzie, in the gambling example, simply acts against her currently held 
better judgment, or that she, in the philosophy conference example, merely voices 
concession to the famous philosophers’ objections in order to appease them. Rather, in 
both cases, she undergoes a change of mind: she actually starts to think that black is more likely 
after the run of reds, and that p is not well-supported after all. Of course, these changes of 
mind are only short-lived blips, since once she leaves the casino table, or the lectern, she 
quickly reverts to her original belief. Still, however fleeting they may be, it is crucial to 
recognise them as genuine changes of mind.  
 
This second feature is especially worth highlighting because it helps to distinguish the 
phenomenon I am exploring from another phenomenon that has received some attention 
under the banner of ‘doxastic self-control’—namely, epistemic akrasia.3 To be akratic in the 
practical sense is to act against one’s better judgment; similarly, epistemic akrasia refers to 
believing against one’s own, concurrently held, better judgment. Whether we can be akratic 
in this epistemic sense is controversial: many philosophers are skeptical about the very 
possibility of epistemic akrasia. But I can happily set that controversy aside for present 
purposes. This is because the kind of doxastic weakness I am concerned with here is not a 
matter of believing against one’s concurrent judgment. On the contrary, in both cases, 
Suzie’s beliefs at every stage are in alignment with how she judges. The problem, then, is 
not the synchronic problem of getting one’s beliefs to conform to one’s judgments but 
rather the diachronic one of maintaining one’s belief (and one’s judgment) in the face of 
non-rational ‘disrupters’. When Suzie chides herself for falling victim to the gambler’s 
fallacy, or when she feels regret that she was unable to stick to her guns in the Q&A, it is 
precisely her failure to maintain belief that she laments. And it is this kind of failure that 
                                                 
3 See, e.g., Heil (1984) and Mele (1987). 
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doxastic self-control is meant to remediate. To exercise doxastic self-control is to stick by 
your beliefs in the face of disruptive factors—to have, as Sarah Paul (2015a) puts it, ‘the 
courage of your convictions’. 
 
1.2 The possibility of doxastic self-control 
Even if you find these examples convincing, you may still be concerned about the proposed 
remedy for such doxastic flimsiness: doxastic self-control. To display doxastic self-control 
is to effortfully maintain belief in the face of ‘epistemic temptations’. But this talk of effort, 
control, and even temptation may seem ill-applied in the realm of belief. After all, it is 
widely agreed that we cannot voluntarily control our beliefs—that we cannot believe ‘at 
will’.4 So how could we possibly exercise doxastic self-control?  
 
In response to this concern it may be helpful to clarify just what kind of control over belief 
is at issue. Following William Alston (1988) we can distinguish three different ways in 
which a believer might be thought to be able to control or affect her beliefs: through direct 
intentional control, through indirect intentional control, and through doxastic influence.5 Direct 
intentional control over belief would be a matter of forming or maintaining a particular 
belief simply by deciding to—that is, by carrying out an intention to form or maintain that 
belief. Though some philosophers hold that we have this kind of control over our beliefs 
(at least in certain cases), this view not widely held6—and it is this view that non-
voluntarists typically have in mind when they argue that believing at will is impossible. In 
contrast to this, indirect (or ‘long-range’) intentional control over belief is a matter of 
controlling one’s future beliefs by means of some intermediate intentional activity. As 
numerous philosophers have pointed out, this form of control is one people can and do 
exercise.7 For instance, we can strategically induce certain beliefs in ourselves by various 
effective means (for example, by means of hypnosis, or by joining a cult), and, equally, we 
can guard against other, unwelcome beliefs arising (for example, by avoiding certain 
literature or people). Finally, the third form of doxastic control is ‘doxastic influence’: this 
                                                 
4 Classic arguments can be found in Williams (1973), who claims believing at will is conceptually impossible, and 
Alston (1988), who claims it is psychologically impossible.  
5 These are the labels Rik Peels (2017, Ch. 2) uses in his illuminating discussion of Alston’s distinction. 
6 See Ginet (2001), Steup (2012) and Peels (2015) for three recent exceptions.  
7 See e.g., Heil (1992), Feldman (2000), Nottelmann (2007). Interestingly, Peels (2017: 69) suggests indirect control is 
more frequently exercised for belief maintenance than belief formation. 
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is a matter of intentionally acting in a way that one knows will profoundly affect one’s 
beliefs, though one does not know which beliefs will be affected and how. Clearly, we have 
a great deal of such doxastic influence, since we can decide what things to inquire about, 
which data or evidence we take into account, which evidential standards we apply, and how 
fastidiously we apply those standards.8 
 
In terms of this distinction, doxastic self-control should be classified as a special form of 
indirect intentional control over belief. Doxastic self-control is a matter of taking intentional 
steps in order to maintain one’s current belief that p, where this means finding ways to 
resist the urge, brought on by non-epistemic factors, such as emotional, social, or 
environmental pressures, to re-open inquiry into the question of whether or not p. It is to 
stick to one’s guns in the face of epistemic weather—to continue to treat as settled a 
question one has previously settled for oneself, despite the onset of unsettling factors. 
Although the question of whether to open or re-open inquiry into some topic is usually a 
matter of doxastic influence (since one does not know in advance how a given inquiry may 
affect one’s beliefs), the phenomenon under discussion is somewhat different, because it 
involves deliberately preventing oneself from re-opening inquiry in order to maintain a 
given belief. So it is not mere influence but rather a matter of control over belief. And it is 
clearly not a matter of direct intentional control over belief, since it is not a matter of coming 
to believe that p simply by deciding to. Hence the concerns that motivate doxastic non-
voluntarism, which are typically directed at direct intentional control over belief, need not 
cast doubt on the possibility of doxastic self-control. 
 
1.3 The rationality of doxastic self-control 
Let us assume, then, that doxastic self-control is possible. Still, one might remain skeptical 
about whether it is ever conducive to epistemic rationality to get oneself to stick to one’s 
beliefs. Indeed, it might seem that what I am calling doxastic self-control actually refers to 
a form of irrationality or epistemic vice—doxastic dogmatism or stubbornness. 
                                                 
8 Rik Peels (2017) has argued that it is in virtue of our doxastic influence that we are fit to be held responsible for 
our beliefs. A number of others have made similar arguments using some notion of ‘control’ that would, in terms of 
Alston’s distinction, more properly be called doxastic influence—see, e.g., Mark Leon (2002), Pamela Hieronymi’s 
notion of ‘evaluative control’ (2006, 2014) and Miriam Schleifer McCormick’s notion of doxastic ‘guidance control’ 
(2015). 
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To appreciate this skeptical worry, consider more closely the notion of ‘epistemic 
temptations’ or ‘distorters’ that I have been using to stress the need for doxastic self-
control. These are non-epistemic factors, such as emotional, social or situational pressures, 
that threaten to unsettle belief. But it is important to note that when these factors pose 
their threat, their status as non-epistemic is not clear to the agent in question. For of course if 
the agent already knew these factors were non-epistemic then they would pose no real 
threat to her extant beliefs, and hence there would be no need for her to exercise doxastic 
self-control. The agent could simply dismiss these factors as mere temptations or 
distortions.  
 
What this means is that doxastic self-control is a matter of sticking to one’s beliefs in the 
face of factors that, though actually non-epistemic, nonetheless do seem to one, for a time, 
to undermine one’s beliefs or to unsettle them. But how could this be anything other than 
an abject failure to respond properly to (what one takes to be) evidence; in other words, 
how could this be anything other than doxastic dogmatism? 
 
In response to this worry, Sarah Paul emphasizes that the kind of ‘sticking to belief’ we are 
concerned with here is not a matter of maintaining one particular view over the course of 
an ongoing, open inquiry. Rather, it is a matter of resisting the urge to re-open inquiry into some 
matter that is relevant to one’s extant beliefs. So it is not quite right to characterize these 
‘epistemic temptations’ or ‘distorters’ as (seeming) evidence pertaining to an open 
inquiry—which would mean that exercising doxastic self-control is always a matter of 
believing against (what one at that moment takes to be) the evidence. Instead, epistemic 
temptations are factors that affect us prior to questions of evidence, factors that shake our 
confidence, unsettle our beliefs, and thus leave the field open for new, perhaps 
unwarranted, beliefs to take their place. 
 
What this suggests is that sticking to one’s belief is not, or not always, a matter of 
stubbornly clinging to belief in face of contradictory evidence. This is precisely what the 
examples above are meant to suggest, that doxastic self-control can promote rational, 
responsible believing—that is can be, as it were, a matter of staying true. But it is important 
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not to overstate this point, and especially not to give the impression that sticking to belief 
by suppressing factors that threaten to shake one’s confidence is a generally rational or 
laudable strategy. For often this kind of sticking to belief, while not a matter of believing 
against the evidence, does nonetheless deserve to be called out as a form of stubbornness—
a matter not of staying true but of simply holding fast. Sometimes the factors that prompt us 
to reconsider questions we have previously settled for ourselves should be heeded, rather 
than silenced. So while we should recognise that there is a place for doxastic self-control 
in our epistemic lives, it must also be acknowledged that there is a fine line between this 
virtue and the corresponding vice of doxastic dogmatism: those who stick to their beliefs 
should be wary of becoming too stuck in them.  
 
So far I have followed Paul in suggesting that exercising doxastic self-control—finding 
ways to stick to one’s beliefs in the face of non-rational factors that threaten to unseat 
them—is both possible, and sometimes rational (or at least not necessarily irrational). In 
other words, doxastic self-control can be a matter of staying true, rather than simply holding 
fast. But Paul does not devote much attention to the further question of just how people 
might succeed in exercising doxastic self-control—and especially how they might do so 
while simultaneously guarding against doxastic dogmatism. Her primary suggestion is to 
say that, when we are faced with epistemic temptations, we can opt to defer to an earlier 
judgment rather than judging anew, this being the prerogative of someone who sees herself 
as ‘occupying a genuinely diachronic first-personal perspective’, rather than only a 
‘synchronic, present-directed perspective’ (Paul 2015a: 657). 
 
In what follows I will explore some alternative ways in which doxastic self-control might 
be exercised. More specifically, in contrast to the kind of intrapersonal mechanism 
discussed by Paul, I will spend the remainder of the paper exploring the prospects for 
interpersonal mechanisms of doxastic self-control.  
 
2. Pettit: fixing belief through avowal   
In recent work, Philip Pettit has drawn attention to the ways in which our discursive 
relationships with other people can bring order and stability to our mental lives. Apart from 
those relationships our inner mental lives would be messy, tumultuous affairs, constantly 
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subject to change and rife with contradictions and tensions. According to Pettit, it is our 
social needs—especially our need to rely on others, and have them rely on us—that help 
us to bring order to this ‘carnival of passing states’ (Pettit 2016a: 21). This is because, in 
the course of shared human life we are called upon to represent ourselves to others, 
including representing ourselves as people who have certain attitudes—who want certain 
things, who hold certain things true, and who seek certain goals. When we respond to that 
call, and express our desires, beliefs and intentions to others, the very fact of doing so 
creates social pressure for us to maintain those attitudes.9 In this way, according to Pettit, 
our interpersonal relationships allow us to achieve a level of intrapersonal stability: 
  
‘You fasten on the attitudes you avow and pledge in determining who you are, letting 
them emerge as fixed points by which others can orientate in their dealings with you. 
The self you authorise others to assume—the bespoken, beholden self—has a robust 
and even constant character that stands in contrast to the shapeless, shifting nature of 
the undisciplined mental life’ (Pettit 2016a: 20) 
 
At the heart of Pettit’s view is a distinction between two quite different ways of 
communicating one’s attitudes to others: by ‘reporting’ them and by ‘avowing’ them. To 
report a state of mind is simply to say of oneself that one is so minded—in much the same 
way that one might report the attitude of another person. But people do not typically report 
their attitudes to one another; instead, the standard way of communicating one’s attitudes 
is by means of avowal.10 This is what we do whenever we assert that p or assert that we 
believe that p. The crucial difference between avowing and reporting belief lies in the 
commitment the speaker makes. When you avow an attitude of belief you lay claim to a certain 
                                                 
9 In a similar vein, Bernard Williams argues that we ‘construct our beliefs’ and ‘steady our minds’ because of the  
‘presence and needs of other people’: ‘[When] we are asked what our belief is, we may simply come out with an 
expression of one that is sincere in the most basic sense of its being spontaneous and uninhibited, and that fact itself 
will encourage us to stand by it, to present ourselves and go on presenting ourselves as people who have that view’ 
(Williams 2002: 193). 
 
10 Note that reporting and avowing do not exclude one another. On the contrary, when one reports one typically 
also avows, except that the content of one’s report and one’s avowal differ. For example, when one reports on some 
state of the world (say, that it is raining), then one typically avows the belief that the world is in that state (the belief 
that it is raining). In just the same way, when one reports that one believes that p, one (typically) thereby avows the 
second-order belief that one believes that p. 
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authority, you authorize others to assume that that is your view. This means that if you do 
not maintain the attitude then you will face serious reputational costs.  
 
Pettit cashes out the commissive character of avowal with reference to the notion of 
‘precommitment’:  
  
‘Such acts [of avowing an attitude] naturally count, by ordinary criteria, as acts of 
commitment in which I put my good name on the line. But they need only be 
commitments in the strategic, game-theory sense of precommitments […] In making 
a precommitment, say to performing a certain action, I place a side-bet on doing what 
I say I will do, where I stand to lose my stake should I fail to do it. By analogy, in 
making an avowal […] I bet on myself to display the attitude avowed’ (Pettit 2016b: 
226-7) 
 
This way of characterizing the commitment involved in avowal is significant for the present 
discussion, because precommitments are well-known tools for practical self-control—they 
are ways of manipulating your own future options and incentives so as to lock yourself in 
to a certain course of action. The archetypal precommitment was Ulysses’s act of binding 
himself to the mast of his ship so that he could hear the Sirens’ song without the risk that 
he would succumb to the temptation to change course. But precommitments need not 
always involve depriving oneself temporarily of agency, in the Ulyssean fashion. They can 
work in subtler ways, by introducing penalties or social costs for failing to fulfill your 
intentions. For example, there are apps that will punish you when you procrastinate on 
your work computer, or fine you when you try to phone your ex after 2am. And a 
precommitment-based strategy may also involve recruiting other people, with or without 
their knowledge or consent, into some kind of policing role. This is why people who are 
prone to procrastination sometimes choose to work in the company of others, rather than 
in the judgment-free zone of a secluded office. 
 
Pettit’s central claim, then, is that the avowal of belief functions in the same basic way, 
raising the stakes for the speaker, placing her more firmly on the hook, and so giving her a 
powerful reason for sticking to her belief in the face of any would-be epistemic 
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temptations. The practice of avowal thus has a built-in steadying mechanism, one which is 
mobilized in producing the ‘bespoken, beholden self’.11 The beliefs we bespeak, by means 
of avowal, are those to which we are then beholden, since others are authorised to hold us 
accountable for them. If we are too flimsy as believers, if we avow a belief one moment, 
then groundlessly backtrack the next, we will suffer serious reputational harm—we will not 
succeed in proving ourselves reliable interlocutors.12  
 
Is it possible, then, to harness this built-in steadying mechanism as a part of a conscious 
strategy of doxastic self-control? Pettit himself is not explicit on this point, though there 
would appear to be nothing in his account that would preclude that possibility. In fact, he 
sometimes implies that using other people for the purposes of achieving mental stability is 
something we all do all the time: 
 
‘we each make good use of the reputational pressures that others bring to bear on 
us when they form expectations, by our license, about what we will think and do. 
Those pressures force us to be careful to advertise only attitudes we can live up to 
and to be careful about living up to the attitudes we advertise’ (Pettit 2016b: 306) 
 
                                                 
11 It is worth noting that Pettit’s idea, that avowal serves to stabilize attitudes, is at least in part an empirical claim. Are 
there empirical studies that support it? Pettit himself does not explicitly refer to any such data, but I think there is in 
fact a good deal of empirical literature that is in line with his proposal. Some of this literature concerns the way people 
shape or control their own minds by ascribing attitudes to themselves: put simply, people tend to form, maintain or 
go along with the attitudes that they have ascribed to themselves, even in cases where they did not, prior to the 
ascription, have the attitude ascribed. This is supported by so-called ‘confabulation’ cases, in which subjects are led to 
falsely self-ascribe a preference, intention or desire, and then proceed to honour the self-ascribed attitude in their 
ongoing thought and behavior (see e.g., Gazzaniga 1985). According to Peter Carruthers (2009: 127), ‘attributions of 
mental states, even if initially confabulated, are likely to be self-fulfilling. This is because agents will feel obliged to act 
in ways that are consistent with the mental states that they have attributed to themselves.’  
Also relevant to Pettit’s claim are the numerous social psychological studies that investigate how making various kinds 
of verbal commitment increases the likelihood of the speaker behaving and thinking in line with those commitments. 
For example, there are studies showing that people are more likely to follow through on medical treatment when they 
are made to promise they will do so (Kulik & Carlino 1987); there is research demonstrating the efficacy of pledges in 
fostering healthier food purchasing (Schwartz et al 2014); there are studies that indicate that recycling practices and 
pro-recycling attitudes can be promoted by getting people to enter written agreements (Schultz et al 1995); and there 
are studies that have shown  the efficacy of oath-taking in inducing truthfulness (Jacquemet et al 2013). The idea 
behind many of these studies is that people have a basic drive or bias towards consistency, and hence will be strongly 
motivated to think and act in line with their professed commitments. As Robert Cialdini (2009: 52) puts it: ‘Once we 
have made a choice or taken a stand, we will encounter personal and interpersonal pressures to behave consistently 
with that commitment. Those pressures will cause us to respond in ways that justify our earlier decision.’ (Thanks to 
a reviewer for encouraging me to address this point.)  
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In fact, it is not difficult to think of examples in which the reputational pressures associated 
with avowal appear to be purposefully exploited in order to get people to stick to their 
beliefs. In many such cases the use of these pressures is institutional. Think, for example, 
of religious rituals that involve new converts declaring their belief to a congregation, an act 
that surely makes it harder for them to waver in their faith later on. And there are less 
institutionalised cases too, such as when holders of unpopular opinions openly declare their 
stance, and so make it harder for themselves to abandon that stance later. In these cases, 
avowal functions as a kind of doxastic precommitment—a matter not so much of binding 
oneself to the mast as nailing one’s colours to it, steeling oneself against future disrupters 
of the belief by openly declaring it. 
 
3. Gilbert: doxastic coercion through collective belief 
Whereas Pettit’s account of avowal involves the idea that the speaker makes a commitment 
towards her audience, the next proposal I want to examine involves a different sort of 
interpersonal commitment—one made along with others. The proposal is Margaret Gilbert’s 
notion of ‘joint commitment’, and specifically the sort of joint commitment that Gilbert 
claims is involved in the phenomenon of ‘collective belief’.13   
 
According to Gilbert, a collective belief is formed whenever two or more people express 
to one another their readiness to let some proposition p stand as their view, that is, the 
view of them as a group. It might happen, for example, by my saying ‘Wow, those spring 
rolls were amazing’ and you responding, ‘Yes, they certainly were’. According to Gilbert, 
what is going here is not that I am letting you in on my view, that the spring rolls were 
amazing, and you are responding by letting me know that you of the same mind. Rather, I 
put out the proposition the spring rolls were amazing as something we might go in for together. 
So it is as though, in saying ‘Wow, those spring rolls were amazing’ I extend to you an 
invitation to join with me in this enterprise: of our believing the spring rolls were amazing. 
If you take up the invitation then we have succeeded in forming a collective belief. We will 
both then be disposed to make what Gilbert calls ‘collective belief statements’—for 
                                                 
13 Gilbert (1987, 1994, 2002a), Gilbert & Pilchman (2014) 
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example by declaring this collective belief to some third party (‘We think those spring rolls 
were amazing’).  
 
Gilbert accounts for this sort of phenomenon by invoking the idea of a joint commitment. 
A joint commitment is a commitment of and by several people to their ‘acting as a body’ 
in some way (where ‘acting’ is to be understood broadly enough to include the having of 
an attitude).14 In the case of a collective belief that p, the parties jointly commit to believing 
that p as a body, or as Gilbert also puts it, to ‘emulate, as far as possible, a single [believer 
of p]’ (2002a: 139). According to Gilbert, this form of commitment has important 
normative implications: the parties to any joint commitment owe it to one another to play 
their respective parts in seeing to it that they jointly fulfill the commitment. So if we jointly 
commit to believing, as a single body, that the spring rolls are delicious, then according to 
Gilbert each of us owes it to other to speak and act in accordance with our believing that, 
and each of us has the standing to rebuke the other for failing to fulfill that obligation. So 
if you suddenly start disparaging the spring rolls to a third party, I might pull you aside and 
rebuke you, saying ‘Hang on, didn’t we think they were amazing?’15  
 
One important feature of Gilbert’s account of collective belief concerns the relation 
between collective belief and the personal beliefs of the parties involved. Gilbert is 
emphatic that her account differs from what she calls ‘summativism’ about collective 
belief—the view that collective belief is just a matter of what all or most of the people 
included in the collective personally believe. By contrast, on Gilbert’s view it is neither 
necessary nor sufficient for the several parties to a collective belief to hold that same belief 
personally. For it may be that, in the situation described above, neither of us really likes the 
spring rolls at all, yet in virtue of our being jointly committed, we each incur the obligation 
                                                 
14 Gilbert (2002b: 41) 
15 One might wonder what collective belief really amounts to, given that it does not require the parties to hold that 
belief themselves. I think Gilbert’s answer to this question would be that collective belief amounts to a complex 
normative situation—a package of rights and responsibilities on the part of the parties to a collective belief—that is 
brought into existence by the formation of a joint commitment. A number of philosophers have found this kind of 
response unsatisfying, however. More specifically, they do not see why collective belief should be called ‘belief’ at all, 
since it does not aim at truth and can be formed voluntarily (see esp. Wray 2001; Meijers 2003). In recent work, 
Gilbert has conceded some of this criticism (Gilbert & Pilchman 2014) and accepted that collective belief may not 
share all the features of individual belief. I do not think this debate over whether collective belief is belief properly 
so-called affects my discussion here. The question is simply whether the phenomenon described and analysed by 
Gilbert (whether or not we wish to label it collective belief) can be mobilized by individuals as a tool for doxastic self-
control.  
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to speak and act in line with our collectively believing the spring rolls were amazing. 
Conversely, both of us might personally believe the spring rolls were amazing, without this 
being something we are bound together in doing—in the sense that we owe each other our 
compliance.  
 
Nevertheless, despite her emphatic non-summativism about collective belief, Gilbert is 
also clear that collective beliefs tend to have a profound influence over the personal beliefs 
of group members. According to her, collective beliefs have what Durkheim called 
‘coercive power’, in the sense that group members will be strongly motivated to adopt the 
group view themselves. Gilbert explains this with reference to the way in which the parties 
to a collective belief make themselves liable to be rebuked by other parties if they do not 
toe the party line (as it were). She illustrates this with an example: 
 
‘Bob and Judy collectively believe that the conservation of species is an important goal. 
When this collective belief was formed Judy herself personally believed the opposite. 
Now that the collective belief is in place, Judy recognises that Bob has the standing to 
rebuke her for expressing a view in conflict with it. This leads her to suppress any 
inclinations bluntly to assert that the conservation of species is unnecessary. Such 
inclinations initially come to her at times, but their incidence diminishes as a result of 
such regular suppression. Indeed, the belief that prompts them subsides. This will leave 
the field open for what she and Bob collectively believe to become her personal belief. 
If she regularly mouths the collective belief, or hears Bob mouthing it, this may well 
happen’. (Gilbert 2004: 99). 
 
This example describes a familiar process. People do often join with others in letting some 
view stand as their collective view, despite their own personal disagreement or reservations. 
In doing so they may be motivated by sound social or political reasons, and they may 
privately resolve to maintain their personal (dissenting) view. However, once the collective 
belief is established, the pressures associated with being a party to that collective view can 
easily erode their personally held beliefs, so that they end up, for no good epistemic reason, 
sharing the view of the group. This seems to be what happens to Judy. 
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In the case of Judy and Bob the coercive power of collective belief is not deliberately 
exploited by Bob, nor is Judy cognisant of its impact on her. It just sort of happens. But it 
seem that the coercive power of collective belief could, in principle, be purposefully 
exploited by someone in order to influence either their own, or someone else’s, belief. In 
fact, Gilbert makes this point herself when she writes: 
 
‘Getting others to join you in jointly accepting a certain view is a good way of making 
that view the personal view of those others … and indeed, of oneself’ (1987: 198)  
 
Since, according to Gilbert, the coercive power of collective belief can be harnessed, it 
seems plausible it could be harnessed as a tool for doxastic self-control.16 In other words, 
it seems as though someone could enter a joint commitment to believe something along 
with others precisely in order to coerce herself—in other words, to bring her future self—
into maintaining that belief personally.  
 
By way of example, imagine an amateur paleontologist living under an oppressive, 
staunchly creationist political regime. Based on her own testing and analysis of the fossils 
she has found, she discovers that, contrary to her society’s popular belief, the earth must 
be billions (rather than thousands) of years old. However, when she expresses this belief 
to others, most people either ridicule her, or threaten to report her to the authorities (there 
are severe penalties for such heresy). She does hear, from time to time, of similarly-minded 
people, but these are few and far between, and to her disappointment she finds that over 
time they too come to embrace the orthodoxy. She realizes that, in her current social and 
political climate, this may well happen to her, too: her rationally formed belief will be hard 
to maintain in the long run.   
                                                 
16 Like Pettit, Gilbert does not cite empirical literature in support of her claim that collective belief tends to have a 
profound influence on individual belief. Although it is not exactly clear just what relation it bears to Gilbert’s notion 
of collective belief, some relevant empirical research may be found within the literature on ‘groupthink’ (Janis 1982; 
Esser 1998). Groupthink concerns the way in which certain groups or organisations establish consensus by avoiding 
conflict and suppressing dissenting views. There is evidence that suggests that groupthink can lead not just to the 
behavioural compliance of members with the established group views but also to their ‘internalization’ of these views. 
In other words, groupthink can lead members to bring their attitudes into line with the collectively-held attitudes (see 
McCauley 1989). According to Irving Janis (1971: 85), ‘The more cohesive the group, the greater the inner compulsion 
on the part of each member to avoid creating disunity, which inclines him to believe in the soundness of whatever 
proposals are promoted by the leader or by a majority of the group’s members.’  
 
17 
 
If our amateur paleontologist wishes to avoid that fate, one strategy open to her would be 
to join with other dissenters in establishing what they each hold personally – that the earth 
is billions of years old – as a collective belief. In this way they might each hope to harness 
the ‘co-ercive power’ of collective belief as a tool for exercising diachronic doxastic self-
control. This could be done informally, simply by chatting with like-minded people and 
mutually expressing readiness to let the view that the earth is billions of years old stand as 
their group view. Or it might be done more formally, by establishing some kind of ‘old-
earth society’, dedicated to the promotion and defence of that particular view. Either way, 
the strategy is the same. In jointly committing to believing as a single body each party 
makes herself accountable to all the others for speaking and acting in accordance with the 
group view. The hope, then, is that the threat of one another’s criticisms or rebukes for 
non-compliance will be enough to counteract the political and social pressures to accede 
to the orthodox view. In this way, each party might succeed in sticking to their original, 
rationally formed belief.  
 
4. The wrong kind of reasons? 
So far I have described two forms of interpersonal epistemic commitment—Pettitian 
‘avowal’ and Gilbertian ‘collective belief’—that seem like they might be apt, in principle, 
be used as tools for diachronic doxastic self-control. To end off I want to consider the 
further normative question of whether using them for that purpose could be epistemically 
rational. Obviously, the answer one gives to this question depends on one’s conception of 
epistemic rationality. I will suggest that according to a certain strict form of evidentialism 
about epistemic rationality, these social mechanisms of doxastic self-control could not be 
considered epistemically rational, because they do not supply the right kind of reasons for 
belief. Yet from a slightly more relaxed perspective, these mechanisms may well be 
considered epistemically rational, since they serve epistemic goals—specifically, they 
promote true and responsible believing.  
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The strict version of evidentialism is widely held, but I think it is particularly well 
exemplified in the work of Pamela Hieronymi.17 According to Hieronymi, belief is a 
‘commitment-constituted attitude’, in the sense that believing that p involves having settled 
for oneself (or being committed to an answer to) the question of whether or not p. This 
construal of belief gives a clear answer to the question what the ‘right kind’ and ‘wrong 
kind’ of reasons for believing are. The right kind of reasons are just those reasons that bear 
on the question that, when settled, amounts to the formation of a belief—that is, the 
question of whether or not some proposition is true. This is why only evidential reasons in 
support of p are proper epistemic reasons for believing that p: they are those reasons that 
bear positively on the question of whether p (is true). Any reasons that do not bear on that 
question are the wrong kind of reasons for believing. So, on this strict conception, believing 
that p because of the health or financial benefits of doing so is believing for the wrong 
kind of reasons, because the health or financial benefits of believing p do not bear on the 
question of whether or not p is true.  
 
It seems to me that the social mechanisms of doxastic self-control considered here would 
fall afoul of this strict evidentialist conception of epistemic rationality. This is because of 
the object of the commitments involved in Pettitian avowal and Gilbertian collective 
belief—what those commitments are commitments to. Consider avowal first. On Pettit’s 
view, when you avow a belief, you ‘bet on yourself’ to have and, within reason, to sustain 
the belief you avow. The object of this kind of commitment is therefore attitude-centered 
rather than content-centered: it is a commitment to the having of the belief, rather than a 
commitment to the truth of the content of that belief. Hence, what this attitude-centered 
commitment makes you accountable to others for is upholding the belief, for speaking and 
acting in line with it, or ‘living up to it’, as Pettit puts it.  
 
But if this is the nature of the accountability incurred through avowal, then it doesn’t seem 
like the reasons that accountability can generate for sticking to your belief would, strictly 
speaking, be the right kind of reasons for belief. Instead, what undertaking that 
                                                 
17 See esp. Hieronymi (2005). It should be pointed out that, in contrast to some even stricter evidentialists, Hieronymi 
does accept that the wrong kind of reasons for belief are still genuine reasons for belief (see Reisner 2009, who for 
this reasons dubs Hieronymi an ‘ecumenical evidentialist’).  
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accountability provides one with is a certain kind of social incentive for maintaining the 
belief avowed. Once one has committed in the manner of avowal, one knows that there 
will be certain social costs associated with wavering or backtracking: these may be 
reputational losses, fewer opportunities for co-operation, and so on. But these social costs 
are not considerations that bear on the question of whether or not the content of the belief 
is true, and so cannot be counted as the right kind of reasons for believing, by the lights of 
the strict evidentialist.  
 
Something similar appears to apply to Gilbertian collective belief. According to Gilbert, a 
set of people collectively believe that p if and only if they are jointly committed to believing 
that p as a single body, or to emulating, as far as possible, a single believer of p. Again, the 
object of the relevant commitment here is attitude-centered rather than content-centered. That is, 
the parties to this joint commitment are committed to upholding the belief in question, 
rather than being committed to the truth of the content of that belief. This shows up in 
the sort of accountability that the parties to a collective belief incur in relation to one 
another. They owe it to one another to speak and act in compliance with their collective 
belief, and they each have the standing to rebuke one another for failure to comply. This 
normative situation can then coerce or encourage the parties to a collective belief into 
maintaining that belief personally.  
 
Here too it appears the interpersonal accountability incurred through collective belief does 
not generate what a strict evidentialist would consider the right kind of reasons for 
believing. It may well be that people are motivated to bring their personal beliefs into line 
with the beliefs of their groups. But the fact that your group has a certain belief—that you 
and others have seen fit to let some proposition stand as the view of the group—is not 
something that itself bears on the truth of the content of that belief. So while there may be 
certain social or psychological advantages to bringing one’s personal beliefs in line with the 
collectively held belief, these advantages are not, on the strict evidentialist view, the right 
kind of reasons for believing. 
 
Considerations such as these make it tempting to dismiss the social mechanisms of doxastic 
self-management considered here as epistemically irrational. But I think that response 
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would be too hasty. This is because although the reasons for sticking to one’s beliefs these 
mechanisms produce are not themselves the right kind of reasons for believing (by the 
lights of the strict evidentalist), they are also not entirely non-epistemic reasons either, on a 
par with the proverbial ‘health or financial’ reasons for believing sometimes associated with 
non-evidentialism. More specifically, it seems that the interpersonal accountability a person 
incurs through avowal and collective belief is in an important sense an epistemic form of 
responsibility, and so may yet promote epistemically responsible, truth-conducive 
believing. If the fundamental goal of epistemic agency is the Jamesian one of forming and 
maintaining true rather than false beliefs, then there are reasons to think that avowal and 
collective belief can serve this goal, and to that extent can be considered epistemically 
rational.18    
 
To see this, consider again the avowal of belief. According to Pettit, the avowal of belief 
makes a speaker responsible to others for ‘living up to [the belief avowed]’. But what exactly 
does it take to ‘live up to’ a belief? As we have seen, Pettit himself stresses the need to 
speak and act in line with the belief, on pain of suffering the social costs associated with 
wavering or backtracking. But it could be argued that this represents only part of the 
picture—i.e., that truly ‘living up to’ one’s belief is not only a matter of maintaining the belief 
but also a matter of fulfilling certain distinctively epistemic responsibilities associated with 
the belief avowed.19 When one avows a belief one not only projects a certain picture of 
oneself as a holder of that attitude, one also makes oneself liable to epistemic challenges 
(‘Not p!’) or queries (‘Why do you think that p?’) from one’s audience. In response to such 
challenges and queries, someone who has avowed their belief is under a certain amount of 
normative pressure to answer those challenges and queries, where this means providing 
properly epistemic reasons in reply—reasons that do bear on the question of whether the 
avowed belief is true. And here it is worth noting that, just as there are social costs 
associated with failing to maintain one’s avowed belief, so too there are social costs 
associated with maintaining one’s avowed beliefs in the face of unanswered challenges or 
criticism. So someone who suspends her belief in response to a justified challenge or 
legitimate query does not necessarily suffer a blow to her reputation; on the contrary, being 
                                                 
18 I am grateful to a reviewer for suggesting this line of reasoning.  
19 In (Townsend, m.s) I criticize Pettit for neglecting this aspect of epistemic answerability. 
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open and responsive to others’ rational critique can actually enhance one’s reputation as a 
responsible epistemic agent.20  
 
It is this dimension of epistemic answerability, and the way it encourages the maintenance of 
defensible belief, that I think may help to vindicate the rationality of belief-avowal as a 
strategy of doxastic self-control. When you avow a belief you make yourself answerable to 
others, in the sense that you knowingly undertake to offer reasons—proper epistemic 
reasons—in response to the challenges and queries of others. Though the prospect of such 
challenges and queries is not itself something that bears on the content of the beliefs you 
avow, it nonetheless provides a strong incentive to be apprised of those reasons. The 
upshot is that avowing one’s belief does indeed give one reason to maintain and defend 
the belief—not come what may, but only as long as the belief proves to be defensible. If we 
set strict evidentialism aside, it seems natural to count this as an epistemically rational form 
of doxastic self-control: in the terms adopted earlier, it is a matter of staying true rather than 
holding fast. 
 
A similar point can be made with respect to collective belief. According to Gilbert, the 
parties to a collective belief that p owe it to one another to speak and act in line with that 
belief, or to ‘emulate, as far as possible, a single believer of p’. Like Pettit, Gilbert cashes 
this out in terms of belief maintenance. She claims that the primary obligations of the parties 
to a collective belief are that they play their respective parts in upholding that belief, by, for 
instance, not openly expressing disagreement, or by ‘act[ing] as would any of several 
mouthpieces of the body in question’ (Gilbert 2002a: 140, emphasis in original). However, it 
is not clear that this is all there is, or should be, to ‘emulating a single believer of p’. After 
all, a single believer of p would not simply be required to voice the belief that p; she would 
also be epistemically answerable for that belief, in just the sense described above, of being 
liable to epistemic challenges and queries, and required to answer such challenges and 
queries with properly epistemic reasons.21  
 
                                                 
20 Thanks to a reviewer for suggesting this point.  
21 In previous work (Townsend 2016) I have criticized Gilbert’s account of collective belief for its failure to 
accommodate this epistemic kind of answerability. 
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If this is right, then the establishment of collective belief, no less than the avowal of 
individual belief, involves the undertaking of a kind of epistemic answerability—here a kind 
of joint epistemic answerability, undertaken by and dischargeable by the group as a whole 
(the ‘plural subject of belief’, as Gilbert would call it). I think this is significant when 
considering the rationality of using collective belief as a tool for doxastic self-control. It is 
not obviously epistemically irresponsible to join with others in believing something, when 
one anticipates epistemic temptations that one would not be able to withstand alone. This 
need not be a matter of taking refuge within a community of like-minded people, in order 
to protect one’s belief. Instead, it can be a matter of taking an epistemic stand along with 
others, and facing the challenges to that belief together. As was the case with avowal, here 
too we find that the social reasons for sticking to one’s belief provided by being a party to 
a collective belief—reasons of solidarity or conformity—are not what a strict evidentialist 
would consider the right kind of reasons for believing. Yet because the group itself is 
epistemically answerable for its belief, these social reasons are still closely tied to the right 
kind of reasons for believing, and so can promote responsible, true believing. The parties 
to a collective belief have the standing to keep each other in line with respect to upholding 
the collective belief—not come what may, but only so long as they, together, can defend 
that belief on the basis of proper epistemic reasons. Insofar as this joint epistemic 
undertaking has a stabilising effect on the members’ beliefs, this mechanism need not be 
dismissed as irrational. Instead, it can be seen as a matter of staying true together. 
 
Conclusion 
My aim in this paper was to explore the feasibility and rationality of using interpersonal 
epistemic commitments as mechanisms of doxastic self-control. I looked in particular at 
Philip Pettit’s account of belief-avowal, and Margaret Gilbert’s account of collective belief. 
With respect to the feasibility question, I followed Pettit and Gilbert in suggesting that 
these forms of interpersonal epistemic commitment make people responsible to one 
another for maintaining or living up to belief in question, and hence that they are apt tools 
of doxastic self-control. With respect to the rationality question, I explored something that 
is neglected by both Pettit and Gilbert, namely the way in which both belief-avowal and 
collective belief involve undertaking a distinctively epistemic form of answerability for the 
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belief in question. It is this, I suggested, that may ultimately vindicate the rationality of 
these forms of commitment as tools for doxastic self-control.  
 
If correct, I think this conclusion puts some pressure on the still widespread tendency to 
think of responsible epistemic agency as a fundamentally individual achievement. Our 
epistemic agency is not an isolated individual enterprise; it is socially situated and socially 
enacted. We rely on one another in myriad ways in our epistemic lives—to share our 
knowledge with one another; to model epistemic virtue; and, as I have suggested here, to 
hold one another epistemically responsible, and thereby help each other in staying true. 
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